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COMMENTS 
INSURANCE-RATE REGULATION-COMPETITORS' STANDING To 
SEEK ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF RATE FILINGS-On August 6, 
1958, the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, headed by Senator O'Mahoney, be-
gan its investigation of the manner in which the states have regu-
lated the business of insurance.1 Subsequently, Senator O'Ma-
honey stated that the principal objectives of the hearings would 
be to determine from industry representatives and state insur-
ance regulatory authorities the extent to which competition2 had 
been preserved under the pattern of state regulation which emerged 
after the enactment of the McCarran Act.3 The subcommittee's 
investigation had been initiated by reports of concerted action 
by the dominant elements in the insurance industry to prevent 
independent companies from competing with the members of 
the rating bureaus on a price basis.4 This concerted action al-
legedly had taken the form of attempts by rating bureaus and 
their affiliated companies to challenge, both on the administra-
tive and judicial level, the efforts of the independent companies 
to secure approval of lower rates.5 The standing of rating bureaus 
and their affiliated companies to challenge independent rate fil-
ings may present a substantial deterrent to successful price compe-
tition by independent companies because of the delays inherent 
1 In his opening statement Senator O'Mahoney emphasized that "[t]hese hearings 
mark the first step in the Sub-committee's major study of the insurance industry some 
thirteen years after the enactment of the McCarran Act. In enacting this legislation 
Congress chose to repose the principal regulatory responsibility over the insurance industry 
in the various states. However, Congress indicated its intention that competition should 
continue to be a prime regulator. The Congress now begins its examination of the 
manner in which the states have exercised their stewardship over the business of insurance." 
Quoted in Navarre, "Federal Investigation of Insurance," A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF IN-
SURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 13 at 15 (1958). 
2 "Competition is the life blood of the free enterprise system. When the McCarran 
Act was passed, Congress was, of course, aware that various states had approved the fixing 
of rates in concert through rating bureaus. Nevertheless, the legislative history makes it 
perfectly clear that Congress intended that competition would continue to act as a prime 
regulator in the insurance industry .... Subsequent laws enacted by the States for rate 
regulation reaffirmed that policy and specifically provided for variations in rates in several 
cases in accordance with this express declaration of policy by Congress." Statement of 
Senator O'Mahoney, quoted in THE WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, May 30, 1959, p. 1116:1. 
3 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1011-1015. 
4 See statement of Senator O'Mahoney, S. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary on the Insurance Industry, 
86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1050 (1959) (hereinafter cited Insurance Industry Hearings). 
5 See, generally, Statement of John A. Diemand, President of the Insurance Company 
of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, p. 1121; Statement of W. Perry Epes, on 
behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, p. 1151. 
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in the administrative and judicial process. The purpose of this 
comment is to explore, in the light of the All-Industry pattern 
of regulation and the applicable public policy considerations, 
the right of rating bureaus and their members to such standing 
at the administrative level.6 
A. Background of the McCarran Act 
The necessity of cooperative action in the promulgation of 
insurance rates has long been recognized. Because the actual 
cost of insurance cannot be determined in advance, the industry has 
resorted to a collective pooling of the loss and expense experience 
of individual companies in an effort to secure as broad a statistical 
base as possible for the purpose of predicting with the greatest 
accuracy the costs applicable to a future period. In this respect, 
the substantial progress µiade by the insurance industry since 
mid-nineteenth century has been attributable, in part, to the de-
velopment of the rating bureau which, as a statistical agent for 
its member companies, collected and combined their statistical 
experience and promulgated a rate structure to which the mem-
bers had previously agreed to adhere. Since no single company 
had sufficient experience of its own, resort to the work product 
of a rating bureau was a practical necessity in the establishment 
of a rate structure. The threat of expulsion from the bureau for 
infractions of its rules served admirably to achieve industry uni-
formity in prices and coverages, thus allowing little room for in-
dependent action. Consequently, the decision in United States 
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association1 that the federal gov-
ernment had plenary power to regulate the business of insurance 
carried serious implications with regard to the continued existence 
of a regulatory scheme which had been characterized primarily 
by private industry controls and only infrequently by adequate 
state regulation. 8 Furthermore, the applicability to the insurance 
6 This comment will be confined to a discussion of the question of standing at the 
administrative level. Although the problem of standing at the judicial level is important, 
tbe absence of pertinent pre-enactment legislative materials precludes a discussion of 
statutory standing at the state level conferred in terms of "aggrieved party" provisions. 
However, the policy considerations discussed in Part II of the comment appear equally 
applicable to both problems. 
7 322 U.S. 533 (1944). For a discussion of the South-Eastern Undenvriters case, see 
Powell, "Insurance As Commerce," 57 HAR.v. L. REv. 937 (1944). 
s See Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 546-552 (1958). 
For a survey of state regulation prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters case, see com-
ment, 33 GEO. L. J. 70 (1944). · 
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business of the Sherman Antitrust Act,9 which had previously 
been interpreted as condemning all price-fixing agreements with-
out regard to their reasonableness,10 presaged the end of coopera-
tive rate-making.11 
Shortly after the South-Eastern Underwriters decision12 a bill 
was introduced in Congress, based on a model bill submitted by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which 
emerged in an amended form as the McCarran Act.13 The basic 
purpose of the act was expressed in section 1: 
" ... the Congress hereby declares that the continued regu-
lation and taxation by the several States of the business of 
insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any 
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by 
the several states."14 
o 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1-7. The Sherman Act was 
intended to afford protection against price manipulations which resulted from monopolies 
and combinations in restraint of trade, by declaring illegal all contracts, combinations, 
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, and any attempt to monopolize any 
part of trade or commerce with or without the use of boycotts, coercion or intimidation. 
10 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
11 The seriousness of the situation presented by the South-Eastern Underwriters case 
is indicated by the fact that briefs amid curiae for rehearing were submitted by the 
attorneys general of 41 states. See Orfield, "Improving State Regulation of Insurance," 32 
MINN. L. REv. 219 at 222 (1948). 
12 Even while the South-Eastern Undenvriters case was pending before the Supreme 
Court the Walter-Bailey-Van Nuys Bill [S. 1362, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1943)), which would have completely exempted the business of insurance from the fed-
eral antitrust laws, was introduced in the House. The bill passed the House [90 CONG. 
REc. 6565 (1944) ] and was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but died 
on the calendar. See comment, 32 GEo. L.J. 66 (1943). One reason for the bill's failure 
to pass was a survey conducted by the Department of Justice which revealed that about 
one-half of the states in which rating bureaus operated made inadequate provision for the 
regulation of insurance companies, leaving the public virtually at the mercy of price-fixing 
combinations which were illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See Joint Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 
3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943). 
13 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §§1011-1015. The legislative pro-
posal submitted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners may be found 
in PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 32 (1945) [here-
inafter cited as N.A.I.C. PRoc.J. 
14 Congressional acquiescence in continued state regulation and taxation of the busi-
ness of insurance has been upheld in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
Cf. comment, 45 CoL. L. REv. 927 (1945). In authorizing the continued control of the 
insurance business by the states, rather than devising a federal regulatory scheme, Con-
gress was motivated by two considerations: (I) it feared the chaos that might accompany 
disruption of well-established patterns of state regulation and taxation [S. Rep. 20, 79th 
Cong., 1st sess. (1945)); and (2) while recognizing that insurance companies doing inter-
state business were, under the existing scheme of state regulation, required to conform 
to the highest standards set by any of the individual states, it doubted whether congres-
sional legislation, influenced by a variety of local pressures, would produce such high 
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The act further provided for a three-year moratorium period dur-
ing which state laws regulating or taxing insurance would not 
be invalidated by any Act of Congress, but that after January I, 
1948, the federal antitrust laws "shall be applicable to the busi-
ness of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated 
by state law."15 
The legislative history of the McCarran Act suggests quite 
clearly that Congress, while recognizing the desirability of collabo-
rative rate-making practices,16 appreciated the competitive re-
straints inherent in concerted price-fixing,17 and required as a 
condition of exemption from the federal antitrust laws positive 
and effective state regulation of the concerted price-fixing ac-
tivities of rating bureaus.18 Furthermore, Congress indicated its 
standards for countrywide operations. See Patterson, "The Future of State Supervision of 
Insurance," 23 TEX. L. REv. 18 at 31 (1944). 
15 Section 2 (b). 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §1012. The moratorium was later 
extended to June 30, 1948 [Public Law No. 238, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 59 Stat. 34 (1947)] 
in order to give Congress additional time to determine whether the states had been suc-
cessful in their efforts to enact effective interstitial legislation. S. Rep. 407, 80th Cong., 
1st sess. (1947). However, section 3 (b) added, "Nothing contained in this Act shall render 
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or 
act of boycott, coercion or intimidation." 61 Stat. 448 (1947), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
(1958) §1013. Section 3 (b) has been applied in Sherman Act prosecutions for in-
surance boycotts. United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (D.C. Ohio 1956) 
144 F. Supp. 684; United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange, (D.C. La. 1957) 
148 F. Supp. 915, affd. per curiam 355 U.S. 22 (1957). For discussion of the meaning of 
"regulated by state law" as used in §2 (b), see Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of 
State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 
56 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 566-576 (1958); Morris, "Meaning of Term 'Regulated by State 
Law' in Public Law 15," A.B.A. PRoc., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw 213 (1949). See also 
Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation of the Executive Committee 
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Gune 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PROC. 156 
at 159 (1945). 
16 "This bill would permit - and I think it is fair to say that it is intended to permit -
rating bureaus. . . • I think that the insurance companies have convinced many mem-
bers of the legislature that we cannot have open competition in fixing rates on insurance." 
Statement of Senator Ferguson during the Senate debate on the McCarran Act, 91 CoNG. 
REc. 1481 (1945). 
17" ••• Congress granted the states and the industry a period of grace within which 
to remove abuses, to revise old laws and to enact new ones. It further provided that at 
the end of this period, the anti-trust laws would again apply to the business of insurance 
'to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law.' Thus, to the extent that 
restraints of trade in the insurance industry have not been removed by state regulation, 
the anti-trust laws will provide the necessary corrective." Address of Manuel Gorman, 
Assistant Attorney General, A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 301 at 302-303 
(1946). 
18 It has been argued that mere token regulation will not meet the requirements of 
the McCarran Act. Only adequate and effective regulation by the states will suffice. 
See Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH L. REv. 545 at 566-576 (1958). 
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intention that future state regulation must effectively ensure 
price competition among insurers.19 
B. Reactions to the McCarran Act 
In response to the congressional invitation implicit in the 
McCarran Act, the Commissioners'-All-Industry Committee, com-
posed of representatives of the National Association qf Insurance 
Commissioners and various segments of the insurance industry, 
met in 1946 for the purpose of drafting model bills which would 
provide for positive state control of the rate-making process in 
both fire and casualty insurance20 while preserving the competi-
tive opportunities for those companies which did not wish to 
subscribe to bureau rates.21 The Commissioners'-All-Industry 
Committee, after lengthy deliberation and extensive compromise 
of conflicting views regarding the degree of state control required 
by the McCarran Act, produced two model bills for submission 
to the state legislatures-the Fire and Marine Rate Regulatory 
Bill and the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill.22 Both 
19 "Nothing in this bill [the McCarran Act] is to be so construed as indicating it to 
be the intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several states to enact legis-
lation that would make it compulsory for any insurance company to become a member 
of rating bureaus or charge uniform rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive 
rates on a sound financial basis are in the public interest." H. Rep. 143, 79th Cong., 1st 
sess. (1945). 
20 Many people in the insurance industry were led to believe that cooperative rate-
making would not come within the aegis of the Sherman Act if such activities were super-
vised by the states. Support for this belief was found in the decision in Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943), which held the Sherman Act inapplicable to a state-controlled pro-
gram regulating the price of raisins produced in California but destined for shipment in 
interstate commerce. This belief was further bolstered by the informal statement made by 
Attorney General Biddle on November 11, 1944, when he appeared before the Drafting 
Committee of State Officials of the Council of State Governments: " •.. if a group of in-
surance companies agreed on rates and filed them with a state commission or state body, 
and that body took active and definite action, made active and definite approval of 
those rates, in that case I think the matter would not be involved at all in the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act." Quoted in Dineen, "The Rating Problem,'' A.B.A. PRoc., SECrION OF 
INSURANCE LAW 104 at 105 (1945). 
21 "In drafting these bills it was recognized that many companies desired to take in-
dependent action. It was recognized that uniformity while authorized should not be made 
mandatory, thereby preserving freedom of action upon the part of those who desire to 
take action independently." Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Rates and 
Rating Organizations, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (May 22-23, 1946), 
N.A.I.C. PROC. 261 at 367 (1946). For statements by the drafters having similar purport, see 
N.A.I.C. PROC. 122-123 (1946). Cf. Joint Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation 
and the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners (December 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 94 at 100 (1946). 
22 The complete evolution of these model bills can be traced in the various committee 
reports which are reprinted in N.A.I.C. PROC. (1946). For purposes of this comment, ref-
erence will not be made to the individual bills. Unless otherwise indicated the cited 
sections of the model bills are identical in each bill. However, although the problems 
which will hereafter be discussed are pertinent to both fire and casualty insurance, they 
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bills contained similar provisions and have since been enacted in 
substantially their original form in almost all of the states.23 
The basic standard imposed by the All-Industry Bills24 is 
that the rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly dis-
criminatory.25 Under the typical procedure all rate filings must 
be submitted to the commissioner accompanied by the supporting 
statistical data upon which the filer relies.26 However, an indi-
vidual insurer may satisfy the filing requirements by becoming 
a member or subscriber of a rating bureau which has been licensed 
by the commissioner.27 Since the rating bureau is authorized to 
make filings on behalf of its members and subscribers, they are 
generally bound by the bureau's filing, except that a filing by 
an affiliated company for a uniform percentage deviation from 
the bureau's rates is allowed.28 Furthermore, each rating bureau 
have thus far arisen only in connection with fire insurance. This may perhaps be ex-
plained by the fact that the rating bureau, both historically and at the present time, 
has played a far more important role in the fire insurance lines. In casualty insurance, 
particularly automobile liability, a large company may well be able to produce a statis-
tically credible rate structure on the basis of its own experience, and consequently its rate 
filings may not be as vulnerable to attack by competitors. ZoFFER, THE HISTORY OF AUTO-
MOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATING 227-231 (1959). 
23 Compilations of the various statutes may be found in Donovan, "Regulation of 
Insurance Under the McCarran Act," 15 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 473 at 485, n. 52 (1950), 
and "Insurance Under the Commerce Clause -The First Decade," Report of Special 
Subcommittee of Committee on Regulation of Insurance Companies, A.B.A. SECTION OF 
INSURANCE I.Aw 10-13 (1954). Most of the existing statutes are products of the period 
following the South-Eastern Underwriters case (1945-1948) and contain at least some 
provisions of the model bills; it is difficult in some instances to determine whether they 
are or are not based on the model bills. However, the following statutes, which either 
require compulsory bureau membership or make no provision for rate filings, seem 
clearly to depart from the philosophy of the model bills. Compulsory bureau membership: 
D.C. Code (1951) §35.1404 (fire); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §§1405, 1406 (fire and casualty); 
Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 175, §113B (motor vehicle); Miss. Code Ann. (1957) §5826 
(fire); N.C. Gen. Stat. (Recomp. 1950) §58-127 (fire), §53-247 (motor vehicle); Tex. Civ. 
Stat. (Vernon, 1952) art. 5.01 (motor vehicle), art. 5.25 (fire); Va. Code (1950) §38.1-227. 
No rate filings required: Cal. Ins. Code Ann. (Deering, 1950) §§1850-1860.3 (fire and 
casualty); Idaho Code (Supp. 1948) §41-3601 (casualty- as long as commissioner finds 
that reasonable competition exists); Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §§379.420 to 379.510 
(casualty); Wash. Rev. Code §48.19. Independent companies are not required to file their 
casualty rates in Montana. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §40-2411. 
24 Reference will frequently be made to the provisions of the All-Industry Bills. Un-
less the contrary is indicated, the reference is to the drafts of May 18, 1946, which will be 
found in N.A.I.C. PRoc. 397-421 (1946), and 4 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 2112, 2124 
(1952). 
25 Section 3 (a). 
26 Section 4 (a). 
27 Section 4 (b). 
28 Section 7. Deviation provisions recognize the right of an insurer who is a member 
or subscriber of a rating bureau to sell below the average level determined by the bureau 
to the extent that the insurer can demonstrate that over a substantial period of time 
its operating expenses have been lower than the average for all companies in the bureau. 
Deviation filings, unlike dividends which represent retrospective price adjustments, apply 
price reductions at the inception of the policy period. 
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is required to permit any insurer to become a subscriber for 
its rating services,29 although no individual company is required 
to become a member or subscriber of a rating bureau.3° Conse-
quently, any insurer may act independently of the rating bureau 
by making its own rate filings directly with the commissioner; but 
its filings, like those of the bureau, must conform to the statu-
tory standards.31 Once an initial filing is made, the rates remain 
on file for a period varying from 30 to 90 days before they be-
come effective, during which time the commissioner is supposed 
to consider the filing and its supporting information and either 
approve or disapprove it.32 In a majority of the states which 
followed the pattern of the All-Industry Bills rate filings not 
specifically disapproved by the commissioner become effective 
immediately after the expiration of the waiting period.33 How-
29 Section 6 (b). 
30 Section 4 (b). But cf. note 23 supra. 
31 Section 3 (a) . An insurer may also subscribe for the services of the rating bureau 
for some classes of insurance, while at the same time making its own independent filings 
for other classes of the same type of insurance. The right of "partial subscribership" 
has been upheld in Arizona [Pacific Fire Insurance Rating Bureau v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 83 Ariz. 369, 321 P. (2d) 1030 (1958)] and New York [Decision of Alfred 
J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, In the matter of the In-
dependent Fire Filing of the Insurance Co. of North America, for Dwelling Classes 009, 
019, 029 and 011, September 14, 1954, affd. without opinion, Cullen v. Bohlinger, 284 
App. Div. 963, 136 N.Y.S. (2d) 361 (1954), leave to appeal denied 308 N.Y. 1049, appeal 
dismissed, 308 N.Y. 886, 126 N.E. (2d) 564 (1955), appeal dismissed 350 U.S. 803 (1955)], 
and is pending in Washington [Insurance Co. of North America v. Sullivan, Supreme 
Court of State of Washington, Docket No. 35042]. 
32 Section 4 (d). The model bills provided for an initial waiting period of 15 days 
which could be extended by the commissioner for an additional 15-day period by giving 
written notice to the insurer or rating bureau that made the filing. The waiting period 
was intended to afford the commissioner a period in which to examine a rate filing and the 
statistical information upon which it was based in order to determine whether it com-
plied with the statutory standards set forth in §3 (a). 
33 Section 4 (d) contains the so-called "deemer clause," which provides that a "filing 
shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this Act unless disapproved by the (commis-
sioner) within the waiting period or any extension thereof." The maximum period during 
which the rates must be on file, which includes the initial waiting period and the allow-
able extension, before the "deemer clause" becomes operative, varies from 30 days under 
the model bills to 90 days in New Jersey. The waiting period and "deemer clause" pro-
visions have been included in fire and casualty rating laws in the following states: Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia (casualty only), Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho (fire only), Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas (fire only), Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio (fire only), Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Utah, Vermont (casualty only), Virginia (casualty only), Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming (fire only). In a substantial group of states a proposed rate 
becomes effective immediately upon filing subject only to the commissioner's power of 
disapproval in the event he finds that at some subsequent time the filing no longer com• 
plies with the rating law: Delaware (fire and casualty), District of Columbia (casualty), 
Maine (fire and casualty), Massachusetts (fire and casualty), New Hampshire (fire and 
casualty), Ohio (casualty), Texas (casualty other than motor vehicle), Vermont (fire and 
casualty), Wyoming (casualty). 
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ever, a substantial group of states require affirmative approval 
before a rate filing can become effective.34 The commissioner's 
power to disapprove a rate filing, whether made by a rating bu-
reau, a deviator, or an independent insurer, is not arbitrary; he 
may not disapprove any filing if it complies with the statutory 
rating standards.35 
From this general description of the All-Industry pattern of 
regulation, it would seem that opportunities for price competi-
tion have been adequately assured through the provisions allow-
ing deviation and independent filings. However, a meaningful 
evaluation of these opportunities is possible only after considera-
tion of the practical administrative problems encountered by in-
dividual insurers in their efforts to compete on a price basis. In 
this respect, the most substantial impediment to deviation and 
independent filings has been the facility with which the rating 
bureaus have been able to challenge them on the administrative 
and judicial level. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BY COMPETITORS 
A. Deviation Filings 
Section 7 of the All-Industry Bills recognizes the right of a 
member or subscriber of a rating bureau to file with the com-
missioner a request for approval of a uniform percentage devia-
tion from the rates filed by the rating bureau.36 However, two 
factors diminish the utility of the deviation filing as a vehicle for 
strenuous competitive action. First, before the commissioner can 
approve the deviation filing he must give notice to the rating 
34 In the following states the rating laws purport to require approval by the com-
missioner before a rate filing can become effective: Alabama (fire and casualty), Florida 
(fire and casualty), Kansas (casualty), Mississippi (casualty), New Hampshire (motor 
vehicle), New Jersey (fire and casualty), North Carolina (casualty), Tennessee (fire and 
casualty). Prior approval provisions are also found in statutes which prescribe compulsory 
bureau membership. See note 23 supra. However, if the commissioner fails to approve 
or disapprove the filing within some specified period, usually 30 days, the filing is deemed 
to be approved. Therefore, these provisions appear quite similar in substance to those 
of the model bills. 
35 Section 5 (a). 
36 In the absence of a deviation filing, a member or subscriber of a rating bureau 
would be bound by the bureau's filing. Section 7. The drafters of the All-Industry 
Bills recognized "that any insurance rate regulatory law which unduly restricts the desire 
of a carrier to pass on a demonstrated economy to the insurance buyer is not in the 
public interest." Report of the Sub-committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (May 
22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 370 (1946). The drafters also recognized that while 
deviation filings are based, under ordinary circumstances, on demonstrated savings in 
the expense portion of the premium dollar, under certain circumstances a more favorable 
loss record of an individual company might justify a deviation filing. Ibid. 
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bureau, which then has the right to be heard in opposition to 
the granting of the deviation.37 The fact that some bureaus may 
have a policy of challenging all deviation applications, or at 
least all those which present a severe competitive threat,38 sug-
gests that the danger of lengthy and expensive administrative 
hearings, accompanied by the possibility of subsequent review 
by the courts, makes the deviation filing a potentially burdensome 
procedure for insurers who wish to compete with the bureau 
companies on a price basis.39 Second, since a deviation filing is 
operative for only one year, its effectiveness as a competitive meas-
ure is uncertain because the rating bureau, which has the right 
to request annual hearings, may be able to prevent the company 
from keeping its deviation in continuous effect.4° Furthermore, 
the necessity of justifying a deviation filing each year imposes a 
financial burden on the applicant which few small companies 
can bear. The cumbersomeness of the deviation procedure and 
the impossibility of obtaining and keeping deviations in effect 
led one major fire insurance company to withdraw from the rat-
ing bureau and file its rates, at least for certain classes of risks, 
independently.41 
B. Independent Filings 
The All-Industry Bills do not require the comm1ss1oner to 
hold a hearing before initially disposing of a rate filing.42 Con-
sequently, a rate filing cannot be challenged by a competitor at 
87 Because the commissioner will have already approved the general rate schedule 
filed by the bureau, which supposedly represents the best judgment of the "experts," 
the applicant will have the burden of establishing that its loss or expense experience 
justifies the deviation. See Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners' -All-Industry 
Laws," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 606 at 613 (1950). 
88 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of W. Perry Epes, 
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, 
p. 1151. 
39See Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners'-All Industry Laws," 15 LAW 
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 606 at 613 (1950). 
40 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of W. Perry Epes, 
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, 
p. 1151. 
41 See "Competition in the Fire Insurance Business," Statement of John A. Diemand, 
given on behalf of the Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Industry Hearings, 
p. 1121. 
42 This conclusion is suggested by the failure of the model bills to provide specifically 
for a hearing before the commissioner considers a filing. Furthermore, §4 (a) provides 
that a "filing and supporting information shall be open to public inspection after the 
filing becomes effective." If a filing is not open to public inspection before it becomes 
effective a competitor would have no basis for challenging it. See Shield, "Some Procedural 
and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws Resulting From Public Law 15," 
A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 233 at 235 (1949). 
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this stage. If the commissioner disapproves the filing, either with-
in the applicable review period43 or at some subsequent time,44 
the filer, whether a rating bureau or an independent insurer, is 
entitled to a hearing. If, however, the commissioner approves 
an independent rate filing, the question arises whether a com-
peting rating bureau or its affiliated companies have the right to 
challenge the rate filing on the administrative level as not con-
forming to the statutory standards. 
Although persons whose only interest in challenging admin-
istrative action was to avoid increased competition have been 
denied standing in the absence of a statutory authorization,45 
where statutory provisions have purported to confer standing 
on a class described as "aggrieved parties" some courts have found 
the requisite standing to be present.46 Thus in FCC v. Sanders 
Brothers Radio Station41 the issue was whether an existing broad-
casting station which would suffer economic injury by increased 
competition had standing to challenge the grant of a construction 
permit to a new station. The applicable statute provided for an 
appeal by "any person aggrieved or whose interests would be ad-
versely affected .... "48 The Supreme Court held that although 
48 Section 16 (a) (fire bill); §17 (a) (casualty bill). 
44 Section 5 (c), which gives the commissioner a continuing jurisdiction over all rate-
filings, was designed to permit the commissioner's subsequent disapproval of a filing 
which previously became effective by operation of the deemer clause [§4 (d); see note 33 
supra], or one which met the requirements of the rating law at the time it was approved 
but which subsequently failed to conform to the rating standards because of a change 
in the statistical or economic picture. See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee 
on Rates and Rating Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 369 (1946). 
Section 5 (c) provides: "If at any time subsequent to the applicable review period [the 
initial waiting period] ••. , the (commissioner) finds that a filing does not meet the 
requirements of this Act, he shall, after a hearing • • • , issue an order specifying in 
what respects he finds that such filing fails to meet the requirements of this Act, and 
stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such filing shall be deemed no longer 
effective •••• " See Cravey v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 214 Ga. 450, 105 S.E. (2d) 
497 (1958). Under §5 (d) the commissioner's disapproval of the filing cannot be made 
effective retroactively. 
45 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., !HO U.S. 113 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. 
TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See, generally, 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §22.04 (1958). 
46 FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scripps-Howard 
Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Associated 
Industries v. Ickes, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943); 
Pacific Inland Tariff Bureau v. United States, (D.C. Ore. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 472. And 
see American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Board, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 
346 (applying Federal Administrative Procedure Act). But d. Kansas City Power and 
Light Co. v. McKay, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 924, cert. den. 350 U.S. 884 (1955) 
(applying Federal Administrative Procedure Act). 
41309 U.S. 470 (1940). 
48 Section 402 (b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1093, 47 U.S.C. 
(1958) §402 (b). 
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the licensee had no legal right to be free from competition and 
the purpose of the Communications Act was to protect the pub-
lic, Congress intended to confer a right of review upon those 
who might suffer economic injury as a result of the licensing of 
new stations because they would be the only persons who would 
have sufficient incentive to challenge the legality of the FCC's 
order. 
Unfortunately, the All-Industry Bills, though conferring stand-
ing upon a class described as "aggrieved," do not clearly indicate 
whether the framers intended to include competitors of the 
rate filer within this class. At least two sections of the bills bear 
upon the problem: 
"5 . . . ( d) Any person or organization aggrieved with re-
spect to any filing which is in effect may make written ap-
plication to the ( commissioner) for a hearing thereon, pro-
vided, however, that the insurer or rating organization that 
made the filing shall not be authorized to proceed under this 
subsection. If the ( commissioner) shall find that the appli-
cation is made in good faith, that the applicant would be so 
aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that such grounds 
otherwise justify holding such a hearing, he shall . . . after 
receipt of such application, hold a hearing . . . upon . . . 
written notice to the applicant and to every insurer and rat-
ing organization which made such filing." 
"16 ... (a) Any insurer or rating organization aggrieved by 
any order or decision of the ( commissioner) made without a 
hearing, may, within thirty days after notice of the order to 
the insurer or organization~ make written request to the (com-
missioner) thereon. The (commissioner) shall hear such par-
ty or parties . . . and . . . shall affirm, reverse or modify his 
previous action .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Since the rate filer whose filing is disapproved is not entitled to 
demand a hearing under section 5 (d), it must proceed under 
section 16 (a) in obtaining a hearing on the order made by the 
commissioner without a hearing. Furthermore, the "insurer or 
rating organization aggrieved" within the meaning of section 
16 (a) appears to be one which, by the additional terms of that 
section, has received "notice of the order." This can refer only 
to the insurer or rating organization whose own filing has been 
the subject of the adverse order made without a hearing; conse-
quently, section 16 (a) cannot apply to competing insurers or rat-
1960] COMMENTS 741 
ing organizations which do not, and are not entitled to, receive 
any "notice of the order" approving an independent rate filing.49 
On the other hand, the history of section 5 (d), which was in-
tended to permit an appeal directly to the commissioner by one 
who was attacking the validity of the entire filing,110 leaves doubt 
as to who may initiate the appeal and secure a hearing. The initial 
draft of the model bills prepared by the commissioners51 con-
tained in section 4 (i) language which, as subsequently modified, 
was ultimately included as section 5 (d) in the final drafts sub-
mitted to the state legislatures. In their limited reference to sec-
tion 4 (i) the drafters implied that its function was to provide for 
an appeal by the public to the commissioner in the event there 
was dissatisfaction with a rate filing.52 However, subsequent 
history suggests that section 5 ( d) was intended to have wider ap-
49 As thus interpreted, §16 (a) would be consistent with the constitutional require-
ment of a judicial-type hearing in the rate-making process. See Jordan v. American Eagle 
Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 281, where 174 insurance companies doing 
business in the District of Columbia sought to enjoin enforcement of a rate reduction 
order issued by the Superintendent of Insurance, claiming the order was constitutionally 
defective. The superintendent had held a hearing at which the companies were allowed 
to submit oral and documentary proof, but the superintendent had refused to disclose 
the evidence upon which his order was based. The court held that although due process 
required a hearing at some stage in the rate-making process, this requirement was satis-
fied by interpreting the District of Columbia Rating Law [D.C. Code (Supp. VI, 1940) 
§35-1403] as providing for de novo review in the district court. See note, 33 MINN. L. REv. 
771 (1949). It would appear that where de novo review was not provided in the rating 
law, the constitutional right to a hearing would have to be satisfied at the administrative 
level. Since the drafters of the All-Industry Bills decided to leave the scope of judicial 
review open to the respective states [Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on 
Rates and Rating Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 375 (1946)], 
it may be inferred that they contemplated the possibility of review other than de novo 
and consequently intended to establish a procedure consistent with maximum due process 
requirements. 
50 This conclusion is suggested by the following language in section 5 (d): "If, after 
such hearing, the (commissioner) finds that the filing does not meet the requirements 
of this act, he shall issue an order specifying in what respects he finds that such filing 
does not meet the requirements of this act . ••• " Emphasis added. Section 9, the so-called 
"Appeal by Insured" section, was intended to apply to the situation where an individual 
insured was dissatisfied with the manner in which the rate schedule was applied to him. 
See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations 
(May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 371 (1946), where the drafters stated that §9 
"has a different purpose .•. from section 5 (d). That subsection enables any person 
aggrieved to challenge the over-all propriety of any particular filing whereas this section 
enables an assured to challenge 'the manner in which such rating system has been ap-
plied in connection with the insurance afforded him.' " See also Shield, "Some Procedural 
and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws Resulting From Public Law 15," A.B.A. 
PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw 233 at 234-239 (1949). 
51 The initial draft was dated October 24, 1945, and may be found in N.A.I.C. 
PROC. 103-120 (1946). 
52 "This section also enables the public to obtain a hearing first from the company 
or rating organization which made the rate and thereafter from the commissioner in the 
event there is dissatisfaction with the rate." N.A.I.C. PROC. 124 (1946). This comment 
would appear to refer more appropriately to §9. See note 50 supra. 
742 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
plication. In the January 18, 1946, draft of the model bills pre-
pared by the commissioners it was provided that any person or 
organization aggrieved by the action of the commissioner with 
respect to any filing might make written request to the commis-
sioner for a hearing thereon.53 The All-Industry Committee's 
draft, on the other hand, purported to limit the right to request 
a hearing to an insurer, a rating organization or an insured per-
son.54 The following statement by the drafters indicates an intent 
to adopt the more expansive language suggested by the commis-
sioners: 
"Your Committee was of the opinion that the suggestion ad-
vanced by the All-Industry Committee resulted in too great 
a restriction and that any aggrieved person should have the 
right to request a Commissioner to grant a hearing."55 
At any rate, section 5 ( d) was intended at the very least to confer 
the right to request a hearing on an insurer or a rating organiza-
tion. Since the express language of section 5 ( d) precludes the fil-
ing insurer or rating organization from proceeding under that 
subsection, it would seem that the insurer or rating organization 
· referred to by the drafters must have been a competitor of the 
filer. Moreover, the drafters' final pronouncement before sub-
mission of the final draft of the model bills for the approval of 
the membership of the NAIC contained the following comment 
(hereafter referred to as the drafters' "final comment"): 
"'Subsection ( d) is designed to provide relief for any person 
or organization aggrieved with respect to any filing. Com-
plete machinery is established to deal with this problem. As 
this draft now stands, the rating organization, the insurer, 
the Commissioner and the buyer are all provided with the 
means of dealing with any defect in the rate structure."56 
Section 5 ( c) gave the commissioner a continuing jurisdiction 
over the rate structure with authority to act if at any time sub-
53 See Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organiza-
tions (April 23-26, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 385 at 387-388 (1946). 
54 See Report of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (March 11-14, 
1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 391 at 395 (1946); Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee 
on Rates and Rating Organizations (April 23-26, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 385 at 387-388 
(1946). 
55 Emphasis added. Report of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations 
(March 11-14, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 391 at 395 (1946). See also Report of the Sub-committee 
of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations (April 29-May 2, 1946), N.A.I.C. 
PROC. 381 at 384 (1946). 
56 Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations 
(May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 361 at 369 (1946). 
1960] COMMENTS 743 
sequent to approval of a rate filing he found that the filing no 
longer met the statutory standards,57 while presumably the buyer 
who challenged the over-all propriety of the rate-filing could 
proceed under section 5 (d).58 Since a competing rating organiza-
tion or insurer cannot proceed under section 16 (a),5° and since 
no other provision of the model bills would provide it with "the 
means of dealing with any defect in the rate structure," the above 
comment would be consistent with the drafters' previously ex-
pressed intention to include a competing rating organization or 
insurer within the scope of the "aggrieved" party provision of 
section 5 ( d). 
Although the preceding discussion of the pre-enactment ma-
terials relevant to section 5 ( d) suggests that the drafters of the 
model bills intended to recognize the standing of competitors, 
the Superintendent of Insurance took a contrary view when the 
issue arose recently in New York.60 In refusing to recognize a 
right in a competing rating bureau to request a hearing for the 
purpose of challenging an independent rate filing, the superin-
tendent interpreted the drafters' final comment as suggesting that 
"the insurer" and "the rating organization" therein referred to 
were the insurer or rating organization that made the filing, thus 
assuming that a member of the insured public would be the only 
"person ... aggrieved" entitled to request a hearing under section 
5 ( d). Since section 5 ( d) requires that the commissioner give notice 
to the applicant and to "every insurer and rating organization 
which made such filing" before holding a hearing, the superin-
tendent concluded that the final comment was limited to a declara-
tion that at the hearing called under section 5( d ), the rating organi-
zation, the insurer, the commissioner and the buyer would all be 
provided with the means of dealing with any defect in the rate 
structure. Furthermore, the superintendent thought it significant 
57 Section 5 (c). See note 44 supra. 
58 See Shields, "Some Procedural and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws 
Resulting from Public Law 15," A.B.A. PROC., SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW 233 at 237 (1949). 
1!9 See text at note 49 supra. 
60 Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, 
In the Matter of Petition.of New York Fire Insurance Rating Organization and Eight 
Individual Members for a Hearing Relating to the Fire Dwelling Rate Filings of the 
Allstate Insurance Company, January 27, 1955. The facts of this case are discussed fully 
in the text at notes 73-75 infra. In 1956 an amendment to the New York Insurance Law 
was proposed which would have recognized a competing rating organization or insurer as an 
aggrieved party within the meaning of §5 (d). [27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) 
§186 (3)]. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regu-
lation, State of New York, Legislative Doc. No. 40 at p. 12 (1956). This amendment was 
not adopted. 
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that the drafters' final comment referred to "the rating organiza-
tion" and "the insurer," meaning the rate filer, rather than to "a 
rating organization" and "an insurer." 
The superintendent assumed that the drafters' final comment 
referred exclusively to the rights under section 5 (d) of the parties 
designated in the comment. His decision could also be supported 
by assuming that the comment referred to the rights of the desig-
nated parties under all of the relevant provisions of the model 
bills. Since the commissioner's authorization to deal with a 
defect in the rate structure rests on section 5 (c), the use of the 
word "draft" in the final comment could refer to the final drafts 
of the entire model bills, rather than to the final draft of section 
5 (d). From this premise it can be argued that the drafters' state-
ment may only express their understanding that each bill as a 
whole provided machinery by which the commissioner, the insured, 
the insurer and the rating organization could deal ·with a defect 
in the rate structure. The commissioner is entitled to proceed 
under section 5 (c), while the members of the insured public may 
presumably rely on section 5 (d), either individually or as repre-
sented by an "organization" of insureds. Consequently, the refer-
ence in the drafters' final comment to "the insurer" and "the 
rating organization" could comprehend the right of the filer to 
deal with an alleged defect in the rate structure by appearing at 
the proceeding initiated by the member of the insured public at 
which the over-all propriety of the rate filing is challenged, or it 
could merely refer to the filer's right under section 16 (a). Further-
more, section 16 (a), which was clearly intended to recognize the 
right of a rating organization to request a hearing, although limited 
to the rating organization which made the filing, is phrased in 
terms of "any insurer or rating organization aggrieved." On the 
other hand, section 5 (d), which describes the class entitled to a 
hearing in terms of "any person or organization aggrieved," sug-
gests, by omission of the word "rating," that what was contem-
plated was an organization of insureds, not a rating organization. 61 
Similarly, the use of the word "person" in section 5 (d), rather than 
the word "insurer," as in section 16 (a), tends to suggest that only 
members of the insured public were contemplated within the 
meaning of section 5 (d). 
61 Since §5 (d) refers to "any person or organization aggrieved" it might be argued 
that the use of the word "organization" in denoting the class of persons entitled to stand-
ing establishes the drafters' intention to confer this right upon a competing rating organ-
ization. However, it would be consistent with the interpretation now being advanced to 
argue that "organization" refers to a group of insureds, rather than to a rating organization. 
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That a member of the insured public should be the only 
person qualified as a "person . . . aggrieved" under section 5 ( d) 
is suggested by the fact that insurance rate regulatory laws are 
enacted primarily for the benefit and protection of the insured 
public, not for the benefit of competitors. Consequently, it would 
not have been illogical for the drafters of the model bills to have 
limited the right to challenge the over-all validity of a rate filing 
made pursuant to the rating law to a member of the insured 
public. Presumably, a member of the insured public would be 
aggrieved by a rate filing when he was insured by the insurer who 
made the filing and the filing was so inadequate as to jeopardize 
the solvency of the filer. 
Either of the above lines of reasoning, if accepted, would 
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the drafters' final 
comment with reference to section 5 ( d) conflicts with their earlier 
statement which ostensibly indicated an intention to include 
competitors within the class of persons or organizations entitled 
to request a hearing. However, the failure of the superintendent 
to consider the earlier comment detracts from the cogency of this 
conclusion, and the alternative line of reasoning is open to the 
same objection. Regardless of whether the history of section 5 (d) 
is interpreted as indicating the drafters' apparent intention to 
recognize the standing of competitors, the writer, after careful 
review of all pre-enactment materials, cannot avoid the conclusion 
that the problem of a competitor's right to request a hearing on 
an independent filing was not even contemplated by the drafters. 62 
The absence of a clearly-articulated recognition of the problem is 
no doubt attributable to the understandable failure of the drafters, 
because of the limited experience with independent filings prior 
to the All-Industry Bills,63 to appreciate fully the possible impli-
cations of the regulatory pattern which they were creating. 
62 The writer assumes that if the question had arisen the independents who par-
ticipated in the drafting of the model bills would, in view of their efforts to obtain as 
much freedom from bureau restraints as possible, have voiced their objections, and that 
these would have been reported in the various committee reports or in the trade journals. 
The complete absence, however, of any reference to a dispute of this nature leads the 
writer to believe that the problem was not envisioned at the time. 
63 It is doubtful whether independent filings were possible at all prior to the enact-
ment of the model bills. At this time, rating bureaus were not required to provide their 
services to all takers, and if the allegations in the South-Eastern Underwriters case typify 
bureau operations during this early period, _it is doubtful whether an _individual com-
pany could have filed independently for those classes as to which its own experience would 
have been adequate without encountering bureau refusal to supply rating services for 
those classes as to which no single company could make its own rates. See note 31 supra. 
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Regardless of whether an ambiguity is found to exist or it is 
concluded that section 5 (d) clearly does confer standing on com-
petitors, it seems appropriate now to examine the policy considera-
tions underlying the All-Industry pattern of regulation. If an 
ambiguity is present, the policy factors thus isolated will be rele-
vant to its resolution. However, if it is concluded that section 
5 ( d) clearly recognizes the standing of competitors to challenge 
an independent rate filing, an understanding of the competing 
policy considerations will provide a basis for assessing the de-
sirability of such a statutory provision. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The question of standing involves a determination of what 
interests are deserving of legal protection.64 In the context of 
insurance rate regulation two broad public policies demand recog-
nition and require reconciliation: 65 (1) regulation must produce 
adequate rates which will assure the solvency of the insurance 
enterprise;66 and (2) regulation should promote a reasonable 
degree of competition which will benefit the insured public 
through lower rates, broader coverages and better service. The 
drafters of the All-Industry Bills, who were familiar with the 
practices condemned by the Supreme Court in the South-Eastern 
Underwriters case and the congressional motives which prompted 
the McCarran Act, based their entire legislative program on the 
principle that the maintenance of competitive rates in the insur-
ance business, to the extent consistent with company solvency, was 
not only in the public interest, but was required by the McCarran 
Act as a condition for the continued exemption of the business 
of insurance from the federal antitrust laws. 67 Furthermore, the 
64 See 3 DAVIS, .ADllllNISTRATIVE LAW §22.04 (1958). 
65 Two additional objectives of rate regulation, that the rates be neither excessive 
nor discriminatory between insureds presenting substantially similar risks, do not appear 
relevant to the present discussion. 
66 For a discussion of the reasons for regulating insurance rates which emphasizes the 
solvency factor, see Marryott, "Why Regulate Insurance Rates," A.B.A. PRoc., SECTION OF 
INSURANCE LAW 305 (1946), 
67 " ••• we recognize that Congress in enacting .•• Public Law No. 15 did so upon 
the understanding that in some phases of the insurance business action in concert through 
rating bureaus may serve a useful public purpose; the Congressional debates prior to the 
enactment of ••. Public Law No. 15 amply establish that fact. This committee has pro• 
ceeded upon the assumption that it was the intent of Congress that provision should be 
made in the State regulatory structure for companies acting individually and for companies 
action [sic] in concert; consequently, we have concluded to embody in our proposed drafts a 
declaration of principle to that effect in the hope that it will serve as a continuing re• 
minder to the State insurance administrators charged with enforcing the law to recognize 
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"purpose clause" of the All-Industry Bills makes it manifest that 
they were intended to encourage reasonable price competition.68 
The numerous provisions in the All-Industry Bills designed to 
foster independent competitive action point to the same con-
clusion. 69 
Recognition of the standing of competitors to challenge inde-
pendent rate filings would undoubtedly diminish the utility of the 
independent filings as a vehicle for competitive action by creating 
a potential power in competitors to obstruct or impair the exercise 
of initiative by individual companies. An insurer contemplating 
an independent competitive filing would have to give careful 
consideration not only to the merits of its rate filing but also to 
the substantial expense which might result from lengthy adminis-
trative hearings and potential court appeals. Furthermore, although 
a rate filing may become effective without affirmative approval by 
the commissioner after being on file for a specified period of time,70 
in practice a filing is made only after a course of consultation 
between the filer and the commissioner in which the latter indicates 
the extent to which a particular filing will be acceptable.71 Hence, 
if competitors are permitted to challenge a filing, the independent 
filer would also have to consider that the value of expenditures 
and commitments made in reliance upon the commissioner's pre-
the proper spheres of both types of operation." Joint Report of the Committee on Federal 
Legislation and the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (December 5, 1945), N.A.I.C. PRoc. 94 at 99 (1946). 
68 Section 1 of the model bills provides, inter alia: "Nothing in this act is intended 
(1) to prohibit or discourage reasonable competition, or (2) to prohibit, or encourage 
except to the extent necessary to accomplish the aforementioned purpose, uniformity in 
insurance rates, rating systems, rating plans or practices. This article shall be liberally 
interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this section." The drafters further stated 
that the "purpose clause ••• was employed to make abundantly plain that there should 
be ample room for initiative in the development of new ideas in the insurance business 
under rate regulatory statutes, and that while companies had the privilege of following 
the patterns set by others, they were by no means obligated to do so and had complete 
freedom to make patterns of their own within the framework of the law." N.A.I.C. PRoc. 
397 (1946). See also Report of the Sub-committee of the Committee on Rates and Rating 
Organizations (May 22-23, 1946), N.A.I.C. PROC. 361 at 366 (1946). Cf. Report of the Joint 
Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulations, State of New York, Legis-
lative Doc. No. 46 at p. 54 (1948). 
69 E.g., independent rate filings are allowed; affiliation with a rating bureau is not 
required; deviations from bureau rates are permitted; rating bureaus must permit all 
authorized insurers to subscribe to their services; all material data on rates are to be 
matters of public record and open to public inspection for the use of independents as 
well as rating bureaus; and the commissioner is given continuing supervision over the 
internal affairs of the rating bureau at the request of an individual member or subscriber 
who is not satisfied with the bureau's action with respect to a rate filing. 
70 Section 4 (d). But see note 34 supra. 
71 See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation, 
State of New York, Legislative Doc. No. 46 at 72-73 (1948). 
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vious assurance of approval72 may be jeopardized by the oppor-
tunity of its competitors to re-open the question of the validity 
of the filing. 
On the other hand, the interest of the insured public in pre-
serving company solvency through adequate rates is apparent. The 
position of a competing rating bureau and its affiliated companies 
is also entitled to consideration. If the independent filing approved 
by the commissioner is in fact-inadequate, members and subscribers 
of the rating bureau are subjected to unfair competition since both 
bureau and deviation filings must conform to the statutory stand-
~rds. Therefore, if section 5 ( d) is interpreted as affording a right 
to a hearing only to an insured person or organization of insureds, 
the rating bureau and its affiliated companies are left without a 
means of remedying the situation. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
any member of the insured public would have sufficient financial 
incentive to assert his rights. 
The problem of resolving these conflicting interests arose 
recently in New York when the New York Fire Insurance Rating 
Organization (NYFIRO) and eight of its member companies 
petitioned the New York Insurance Department for a hearing on 
a rate filing for dwelling classes filed by the Allstate Insurance 
Company which was 20 percent below the bureau rates.73 A hearing 
was initially called in response to the petition, but it was terminated 
upon motion by Allstate on the ground that neither NYFIRO 
nor its member companies were aggrieved within the meaning 
of the applicable provisions of the New York Insurance Law.74 
72 In connection with a new rate filing an insurer must distribute the rating informa• 
tion in the form of manuals to all of its agents and brokers so that the new rates can 
be passed on to the public. Consequently, an insurer would not incur the expenses of 
printing and distribution without first obtaining approval of the new rate schedules 
in advance of actual filing. 
73 NYFIRO alleged that the Allstate filing was inadequate, unreasonable and un• 
fairly discriminatory because Allstate had no previous experience for these classes in the 
state. Allstate had based its filing on a combination of two factors: (1) the loss element 
included in the NYFIRO filing for dwelling classes; and (2) an expense element based on 
a projection of its expenses attributable to automobile insurance (which it had written 
in New York since 1932) to its anticipated fire insurance business. NYFIRO further 
alleged upon information and belief that the Allstate filing would produce an under• 
writing loss if made on behalf of the bureau or its members or subscribers, that it was 
made solely for the purpose of giving Allstate an unfair competitive advantage, and that 
Allstate was subsidized by its parent, Sears, Roebuck &: Company, in a manner not per-
mitted by the New York Insurance Law. 
74 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) §186 (3) and 186-b. Although the language 
of these provisions differs slightly from that of §§5 (d) and 16 (a) of the model bills, the 
commissioner treated them similarly in view of the legislative purpose to incorporate 
"those basic provisions set forth in the model rating biils not found in the New York 
law .••• " New York Insurance Department, 88th Preliminary Report of ·the Superin-
tendent of Insurance to the 1947 Legislature, p. 9. See Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger, 
1960] COMMENTS 749 
Subsequently, the Superintendent of Insurance, in a written 
opinion,75 affirmed the previous dismissal on the grounds that 
"(I) it would be inconsistent with the general purposes 
of the model bill and the New York amendments to permit a 
rating organization and its affiliated companies to intervene 
in a proceeding involving an independent rate filing, since 
such intervention would have the effect of a restraint on com-
petition in pricing practices of their competitor, and (2) the 
specific provisions of the model'bill and the New York amend-
ments do not intend that such rating organization and its 
affiliated companies shall have the standing of an aggrieved 
party so as to entitle them to a hearing before the ... Super-
intendent of Insurance with respect to an independent filing 
of rates of a competitor."76 
On the other hand, in National Capital Ins. Co. v. ]ordan,11 
the court, relying on FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station18 and 
cases which extended its rationale,79 held that a competing in-
surance company did have standing to challenge the validity of 
Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, In the Matter of Petition of New York 
Fire Insurance Rating Organization and Eight Individual Members for a Hearing Re• 
Iating to the Fire Dwelling Rate Filings of the Allstate Insurance Company, January 
27, 1955, at 16. 
75 Decision of Alfred J. Bohlinger, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, 
note 74 supra. The issue was held moot on appeal. Cullen v. Holz, 2 Misc. (2d) 486, 152 
N.Y.S. (2d) 163 (1956), affd. 7 App. Div. (2d) 718, 181 N.Y.S. (2d) 163 (1959), leave to 
appeal den. 7 App. Div. (2d) 841, 182 N.Y.S. (2d) 324 (1959). 
76 In a letter dated March 3, 1955, NYFIRO requested the new superintendent, who 
had since succeeded Superintendent Bohlinger, to commence hearings on the Allstate 
filing on his own initiative as provided by §186 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. On 
rehearing the Allstate filing was approved, but at a level for dwelling classes which was 
approximately 15% below the NYFIRO rates. Decision of Leffert Holtz, Superintendent 
o{ Insurance, State of New York, In the Matter of Independent Filing of Fire Rates by 
Allstate Insurance Company on Initiative of Hon. Leffert Holz, Superintendent of In-
surance, July 1, 1955, affd. sub nom. Cullen v. Holz, 7 App. Div. (2d) 718, 181 N.Y .S. (2d) 
163 (1959), affd. 6 N.Y. (2d) 971, 161 N.E. (2d) 392 (1959). However, in so holding 
the appellate division concluded in a memorandum opinion that NYFIRO and its mem-
ber companies were aggrieved parties, despite the fact that the hearing at which they 
appeared had been called by the superintendent upon his own initiative after an an-
nouncement that the hearing was not to be considered an adversary proceeding. This 
latter case may perhaps be distinguished from the situation where the competitior seeks 
to initiate administrative action by requesting a hearing in its own right on the ground 
that once a competitor is permitted to appear before the administrative agency it acquires 
sufficient standing to challenge the administrative determination in the courts. Com-
pare Matter of Bullis v. DuMond, 274 App. Div. 951, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 452 (1948), affd. 276 
App. Div. 882, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 779 (1949), with Matter of Dairymen's League Co-Operative 
Assn. v. DuMond, 282 App. Div. 69, 121 N.Y.S. (2d) 857 (1953), app. dismissed 306 N.Y. 
595, 115 N.E. (2d) 825 (1953). 
77 (D.C. D.C. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 317. 
78 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See text at note 47 supra. 
79 Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942)~ Associated Industries v. Ickes, 
(2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
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an order of the Superintendent of Insurance approving a deviation 
filing. The court, though presented- with a statute not of the 
All-Industry type,80 did not purport to rest its decision on this 
distinction, but was unable to attribute to the legislature a con-
struction of the rating law which would leave competing insurance 
companies "without statutory right of redress against capricious, 
arbitrary, or unwarranted acts of the Superintendent, however 
flagrant, in connection with deviation application .... "81 
It would also be possible to predicate standing on the doctrine 
of "private attorneys general" enunciated by a series of Supreme 
Court cases.82 Since few members of the insured public would 
have sufficient incentive to inspect an independent filing to de-
termine its conformity with the rating standards, it could be 
argued that a competitor of the filer should have standing to 
challenge the validity of an independent filing as a representative 
asserting the rights of the insured public.83 On the other hand, 
it can be argued that the Commissioner of Insurance, who is the 
executive officer to whom the responsibility for administering 
the rating law has been delegated, is an adequate representative 
of the public interest.84 As head of a specialized department he is 
so D.C. Code (1951) §§35-1401 to 35-1409, though requiring that all insurance com-
panies authorized to do business in the District become members of the rating bureau, 
recognizes that a company may deviate from the rates promulgated by the bureau after 
filing the deviation with the bureau and the superintendent, and securing the latter's 
approval. Provision is made for an appeal to any court of competent jurisdiction by 
"any person aggrieved" from any order, ruling, proceeding or action of the superintendent. 
81148 F. Supp. 317 at 320. · 
82Thus, in Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 at 14-15 (1942), the Court, in 
explaining the Sanders case, stated: " ... these private litigants have standing only as 
representatives of the public interest. . . . That a court is called upon to enforce public 
rights and not the interests of private property does not diminish its power to protect 
such rights. . . . [T]he rights to be vindicated are those of the public and not of the 
private litigants." See also FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Associated Industries 
v. Ickes, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 694, dismissed as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See, gen-
erally, 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §22.05 (1958). 
83 In Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. FCC, 309 U.S. 470 at 477 (1940), the Court, 
in recognizing the competitor's standing, stated: "Congress ... may have been of opinion 
that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person 
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law 
in the action of the Commission in granting the license." 
84 In American Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N.E. (2d) 122 (1943), the court 
held that insurance companies authorized to do business in Illinois had no standing, under 
an "aggrieved party" provision, to challenge an order of the Director of Insurance grant-
ing a renewal license to a Lloyds insurer. "The Director of Insurance is an executive 
officer of the State and his acts as such officer are final and will not ordinarily be dis-
turbed by the courts. The Illinois Insurance Code provides standards which must be met 
by every company seeking a certificate of authority to do business in Illinois. It is the 
duty of the Director to see that those standards are met before such a certificate is issued 
or renewed by him. Courts cannot assume to perform the duties and powers vested in the 
Director, nor to determine whether or not he has acted wisely. If the Director fails 
in the performance of his duty he is in the same position as any other public official who 
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under a duty to see that the standards of the rating law have been 
met before approving a rate filing, and his decision is entitled to 
great weight. Consequently, in view of the countervailing policy 
of promoting reasonable competition in the insurance business, 
it may be desirable to restrict the reviewability of his decision 
approving an independent filing to those to whom the legislature 
has clearly granted that right. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy of promoting reasonable competition in the insur-
ance business contemplates lower rates by forcing companies to 
operate in a more efficient and economical manner. If insurance 
companies are able by collaborative action and dilatory and har-
assing tactics to prevent competitive activity, the public interest 
will not be served. Furthermore, since the South-Eastern Under-
writers case the Federal Government's plenary power over the 
business of insurance has not been questioned. Consequently, 
if the respective states fail to provide the regulatory climate 
conducive to "competitive rates on a sound financial basis" which 
was contemplated by the McCarran Act, the threat of federal 
intervention in the regulation of the insurance business may be-
come more real than imaginary. 85 Where the standing of a rating 
bureau or competing insurer to challenge an independent filing is 
recognized, the situation is pregnant with possibilities of abuse. 
Litigation instigated by combinations of competitors is easily 
improperly exercises the power given him by statute." 384 Ill. 222 at 231-232, 51 N.E. 
(2d) 122 (1943). Cf. City of New York v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923); Matter 
of Dairymen's League Co-Operative Assn. v. DuMond, 282 App. Div. 69 at 74, 121 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 857 (1953), app. dismissed 306 N.Y. 595, 115 N.E. (2d) 825 (1953). 
85 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, acting at the request of 
Senator O'Mahoney which followed hearings on aviation insurance held du~ing the sum-
mer of 1958, recently convened a Federal Grand Jury in New York to investigate alleged 
antitrust law violations in the aviation underwriting field. See JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 
Jan. 20, 1960, p. 1: 4. In response to the recent hearings held before the Senate Anti-
trust and Monopoly Subcommittee, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
has established a special subcommittee [The Subcommittee to Review Fire and Casualty 
Rating Laws and Regulations] to study and evaluate present rating laws "with particular 
reference to various items which have at one time or another been aired and were in fact 
studied by the U.S. Senate anti-trust and monopoly sub-committee.'' See THE NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 20, 1959, p. I. The following statement by Vestal Lemmon, represent-
ing the National Association of Independent Insurers, illustrates quite clearly the position 
of the independents with regard to the "aggrieved party" provisions of the model bills: 
"To make it unmistakably clear that it is the insurance departments and not private 
interests who are actually regulating our business, we believe the NAIC should take a 
firm stand in opposition to recoguition of any right in one segment of the industry to 
obstruct rate filings of their competitors in hearings and litigation." THE NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 27, 1959, p. 29. 
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susceptible of misuse for the purposes of harassing the independ-
ent filer and frustrating its efforts to pass on price savings to the 
insured public. On the other hand, both the insured public and 
the competitors of the independent are vitally interested in making 
certain that competition, if it exists, is on a sound financial basis. 
Where regulation of insurance rates is truly effective and is of 
the quality contemplated by the sponsors of the McCarran Act-
where the Commissioner of Insurance has a competent and well-
trained staff capable of scrutinizing the rate filings of independent 
companies, and has the time to do so-the commissioner can, in 
fact, be said to represent the public interest adequately. It can 
reasonably be presumed that he has given careful consideration 
to the independent rate filing. In this situation the interests of 
the rating bureau or other competitors in making certain that 
the independent filing satisfies the statutory standards would ap-
pear subordinate to the policy of promoting reasonable compe-
tition. But where the commissioner, either through insufficient 
funds, inadequately trained staff, or lack of time, is unable to 
give careful consideration to an independent rate filing8 6 which 
becomes effective automatically by virtue of a "deemer clause," 
it may be sound policy to allow the rating bureau to :challenge 
the independent filing as a representative of its own and the public 
interest.87 
It is suggested that the problems involved in securing judicial 
resolution of the competing policy considerations indicate the 
desirability of an ad hoc legislative reappraisal of the effectiveness 
of rate regulation in the various states. The determination whether 
the present regulatory scheme, as actually administered, adequately 
86 Kimball and Boyce, "The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective," 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 545 at 556-565 (1958), 
suggest that while in some states rate regulation is adequate and complete, in a sub-
stantial number a systematic and constant surveillance over rates is lacking. For a thorough 
analysis of the adequacy of insurance rate regulation in a smaller state, see Kimball and 
Hansen, "The Utah Insurance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in 
Action,'' 5 UTAH L. R.Ev. 429 at 440-449 (1957), 6 id. 1 at 17-22 (1958). A similar study 
of the Montana Insurance Department is as yet unpublished: Kimball and Conklin, "The 
Montana Insurance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation in Action." Cf. 
KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND Ptrauc PouCY, c. 3, §4 (to be published by the Univ. of Wis. 
Press in 1960). 
87 The preceding discussion of policy considerations is obviously applicable to de-
viation filings and raises the further question whether the restrictions on the utility of 
the deviation filing found in the model bills [see text at notes 37-40 supra] are justified 
in view of their stated objectives to promote competition and encourage the exercise 
of initiative by individual companies. Compare text at notes 37-40 supra with notes 36 
and 68 supra. 
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assures competitive opportunity consistent with protection of the 
public interest is essentially one for the legislature, not the courts. 
Thus, where the commissioner adequately represents the public 
interest, the legislature should not recognize the standing of com-
petitors to challenge independent rate filings; but where the legis-
lative evaluation discloses that the commissioner is unable to 
protect the public from the danger of inadequate rate filings a 
statutory provision recognizing the standing of competitors under 
section 5 ( d) may be justified. In the latter situation, the responsi-
bility for preserving competitive opportunity will rest with the 
commissioner and will depend upon his right to require competi-
tors to comply with the "good faith" requirements of section 5 (d). 
If, however, a legislature chooses the latter alternative, it must 
understand that the recognition of the standing of competitors is 
but a temporary ameliorative which is justified only by the present 
state of inadequate regulation. Such a choice will not absolve the 
legislature from its affirmative obligation under the McCarran 
Act to provide adequate and effective regulation as a condition 
of continued exemption of the business of insurance from the 
federal antitrust laws. 
Joel N. Simon, S. Ed. 
